Abstract-Static taint analysis detects information flow vulnerabilities in Java web applications. It has gained considerable importance in the last decade, with the majority of work focusing on dataflow and points-to based approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Detecting information flow vulnerabilities is crucial for web application security. Information flow vulnerabilities are one of the most common security problems according to both OWASPand Cenzic In the top 10 reports in 2013 by both OWASP and Cenzic, about half of the security problems are related to information flow [2] , [23] .
A common information flow vulnerabiltiy is SQL injection, as shown in the example in Fig. 1 (adapted from [18] ). In this example, the user parameter of the HTTP request is obtained through request.getParameter("user") and stored in variable user, which is later appended to an SQL query string and sent to a database for execution: stat.executeQuery(query). At a first glance, this code snippet seems quite unremarkable. However, if a malicious end-user supplies the user parameter with the value of "John OR 1 = 1", the unauthorized end-user can gain access to the information of all other users, because the WHERE clause always evaluates to true. Other information flow vulnerabilities include cross-site scripting (XSS), HTTP response splitting, path traversal and command injection [18] .
Static taint analysis detects information flow vulnerabilities. It automatically detects flow from untrusted sources to securitysensitive sinks. In the example in Fig. 1 , the return value of ServletRequest.getParameter() is a source, and the parameter of Statement.executeQuery() is a sink.
Research on static taint analysis for Java web applications has largely focused on dataflow and points-to based approaches [18] , [31] . One issue with these approaches is that they usually rely on context-sensitive points-to analysis, which is expensive and non-modular (i.e., it requires a whole program). Yet the toughest issue is dealing with libraries (JDK and thirdparty), frameworks (Struts, Spring, Hibernate) and reflection, features notoriously difficult for dataflow and points-to analysis, and yet ubiquitous in Java web applications.
In this paper, we advocate type-based taint analysis. Concretely, we present SFlow, a context-sensitive type system for secure information flow, and a corresponding inference analysis SFlowInfer. We leverage the inference and checking framework we built in previous work [15] , which we have used to infer and check object ownership [15] and reference immutability [16] .
Our inference is modular and compositional. It is modular in the sense that it can analyze any given set of classes L. Unknown callees in L are handled using appropriate defaults. Callers of L can be analyzed separately and composed with L without reanalysis of L. The inference requires annotations only on sources and sinks. Once the sources and sinks are built into annotated libraries, web applications are analyzed without any input from the user. Our approach is particularly effective for handling of libraries, frameworks and reflection. This is because SFlow does not require abstraction of heap objects as it models dependences among variables through subtyping.
The paper makes the following contributions:
• SFlow, a context-sensitive type system for secure information flow.
• SFlowInfer, an inference analysis for SFlow.
• Handling of libraries, frameworks, and reflection.
• An empirical evaluation on Java web applications of up to 126kLOC, comprising 473kLOC in total. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the SFlow type system and the inference analysis. Section III describes techniques for error reporting, techniques for handling of libraries, frameworks and reflection, and techniques for precision improvement. Section IV presents the empirical evaluations, Section V discusses the related work, and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SFLOW TYPE SYSTEM
This section first describes the basic type qualifiers in SFlow (Section II-A) followed by the extension for context sensitivity (Section II-B). It proceeds to formalize SFlow (Section II-C), and then combine SFlow with reference immutability to improve precision (Section II-D). The section concludes with type inference (Section II-E) and several nontrivial examples (Section II-F).
A. SFlow Qualifiers
There are two basic type qualifiers in SFlow: tainted and safe.
• tainted: A variable x is tainted if there is flow from a source to x. Sources, such as the return value of ServletRequest.getParameter(), are annotated as tainted.
• safe: A variable x is safe if there is flow from x to a sensitive sink. Sinks, such as the parameter of Statement.executeQuery(String p), are annotated as safe. SFlow guarantees non-interference [11] from tainted sources to safe sinks, i.e., tainted sources cannot flow to safe sinks. Therefore, we define the following subtyping hierarchy 1 :
safe <: tainted where q 1 <: q 2 denotes q 1 is a subtype of q 2 (q is also a subtype of itself: q <: q). Thus, assigning a safe variable to a tainted one is allowed:
but assigning a tainted variable to a safe one is disallowed:
tainted int t = ...; safe int s = t; // type error!
In the SQL injection example in Fig. 1 , the return value of getParameter() is annotated as tainted, and the parameter of executeQuery() is annotated as safe, as they are a source and a sink, respectively. We annotate the other variables as tainted: Since it is not allowed to assign the tainted query to the safe parameter of executeQuery(), the statement at line 8 does not type-checks, the error indicating an information flow violation.
B. Context Sensitivity
Context sensitivity is crucial to the precision of SFlow. Note that in the context-insensitive typing above, methods append() and toString() are typed as follows (code throughout the paper makes parameter this explicit): query at line 7 is not tainted, but it will be typed tainted because of the tainted return value of toString(). Therefore, the program will be rejected, even though it is safe. SFlow achieves context sensitivity by making use of an additional type qualifier, poly, and viewpoint adaptation.
• poly: The poly qualifier expresses context sensitivity. poly is interpreted as tainted in some invocation contexts and as safe in other contexts. The subtyping hierarchy becomes safe <: poly <: tainted and append() and toString() can be typed as follows:
poly StringBuffer append(poly StringBuffer this, poly String s) {...} poly String toString(poly StringBuffer this) {...}
The poly qualifiers are interpreted according to invocation context. Intuitively, the role of viewpoint adaptation (which we elaborate upon shortly), is to interpret (i.e., instantiate) the poly qualifiers according to the invocation context. In the example above, poly is instantiated to tainted at call sb1.append(user), and to safe at call sb2.append("John"). As a result, the tainted argument in the call through sb1 does not propagate to sb2; thus, query at line 8 can be typed as safe, and the type error at line 9 is avoided.
A polymorphic method must type-check with each instance of poly interpreted as tainted, and with each instance of poly interpreted as safe. Therefore, a poly variable cannot be assigned to a safe one, as enforced by the subtyping relation safe <: poly. Similarly, a tainted variable cannot be assigned to a poly one.
The type of a poly field f is interpreted in the context of the receiver at the field access. If the receiver x is tainted, then x.f is tainted. If the receiver x is safe, then x.f is safe. An instance field can be tainted or poly, but it cannot be safe; this is necessary to ensure soundness.
Viewpoint adaptation is a concept from Universe Types [4] , [6] , which can be adapted to Ownership Types [3] and ownership-like type systems such as AJ [7] , [33] . Viewpoint adaptation of a type q from the viewpoint of another type q, results in the adapted type q . This is written as= q . Viewpoint adaptation adapts fields, formal parameters, and method returns from the viewpoint of the receiver at the field access or method call.
The viewpoint adaptation operation is as follows:
The underscore denotes a "don't care" value. Qualifiers tainted and safe do not depend on the viewpoint (context). Qualifier cd ::= class C extends D {fd md } class fd ::= t f field md ::= t m(t this, t x) { t y s; return y } method poly depends on the viewpoint; in fact, it adapts to that viewpoint (context).
C. Typing Rules
Now we are ready to define the typing rules for SFlow. For brevity, we restrict our formal attention to a core calculus in the style of Vaziri et al. [33] whose syntax appears in Fig. 2 . The language models Java with a syntax in a "named form", where the results of field accesses, method calls, and instantiations are immediately stored in a variable. Without loss of generality, we assume that methods have parameter this, and exactly one other formal parameter. Features not strictly necessary are omitted from the formalism, but they are handled correctly in the implementation. We write t y for a sequence of local variable declarations.
A type t has two orthogonal components: type qualifier q and Java class type C. The SFlow type system is orthogonal to (i.e., independent of) the Java type system, which allows us to specify typing rules over type qualifiers q alone.
As it is evident from the syntax, we consider only explicit flow (i.e., data dependence). To the best of our knowledge, all effective static taint analyses [18] , [28] , [31] take this approach. Fig. 3 shows the typing rules. The rules are standard, that is, they create subtyping constraints at explicit assignments (e.g., x = y, x = y.f) and at implicit assignments (e.g., assignments from actual arguments to formal parameters). The rules for field access, (TREAD) and (TWRITE), adapt the field f from the viewpoint of the receiver, and create the expected subtyping constraints. The rule for method call, (TCALL), adapts formal parameters this and p and return value ret from the viewpoint of the receiver y, and creates the subtyping constraints that link the actual arguments to the formal parameters, and the return value to the left-hand-side of the call assignment.
Let us return to the example from the previous section. Method append() is polymorprhic, i.e., it is typed as follows:
poly StringBuffer append(poly StringBuffer this, poly String s) {...} Let sb1 be typed tainted. The call to append() at line 6, namely sb1.append(user), accounts for the following constraint (for brevity, for the rest of the paper, we typically use only the variable, for example user, instead of the more verbose q user ):
user <: s1 s ≡ user <: s1 poly ≡ user <: s1
Γ(x) = qx Γ(y) = qy qy <: qx
Γ(y) = qy typeof (m) = q this , qp → qret Γ(x) = qx Γ(z) = qz qy <: qy q this qz <: qy qp qy qret <: qx Since user and s1 are tainted, the constraint type-checks. Now let sb2 be typed safe. The call to append() at line 7, sb2.append("John"), accounts for constraint "John" <: s2 s ≡ "John" <: s2 poly ≡ "John" <: s2
Since string constant "John" and s2 are both safe, this typechecks as well. In the first context of invocation of append we interpreted poly s as tainted, while in the second context, we interpreted it as safe.
Method overriding is handled by the standard constraints for function subtyping. If m overrides m we require typeof (m ) <: typeof (m) and thus,
This entails q thism <: q this m , q pm <: q p m , and q ret m <: q retm .
D. Composition with Reference Immutability
The reader has likely noticed that subtyping safe <: poly <: tainted is not always sound. Suppose the field f of class A is poly in the following example:
// because of safe <: tainted t.f = tf; // t.f is tainted safe B sf = s.f; // s.f is safe, unsafe flow!
The program type-checks, but the tainted variable tf flows to safe variable sf. This is the known problem of subtyping in the presence of mutable references, also known as the issue with Java's covariant arrays [22] . The standard solution is to disallow subtyping for references [25] , [26] . This solution demands two sets of qualifiers, safe <: poly <: tainted for simple types (e.g., int,char), and Safe, Poly, Tainted for reference types. While subtyping is allowed for simple types, it is disallowed for reference types. Unfortunately, disallowing subtyping for reference types leads to imprecision, i.e., the type system rejects valid programs. It amounts to using equality constraints as opposed to subtyping constraints, and thus, propagating safe qualifiers bi-directionally, resulting in often unnecessary propagation. Disallowing subtyping is in some sense analogous to using unification constraints as opposed to subset constraints in pointsto analysis. It is well-known that Steensgaard's points-to analysis [29] , which uses unification (i.e., equality) constraints, is substantially less precise than Andersen's points-to analysis [1] , which uses subset constraints.
The following example illustrates the problem:
String user = request.getParameter(''user''); Recall that the return value of ServletRequest.getParameter() is tainted, and the parameter of PrintWriter.print() is safe. If we disallowed subtying for references, the program would be rejected, even though there is no unsafe flow. This is because statement user = str would trigger an equality constraint instead of a subtyping constraint. The equality constraint would force user and str to be of the same type. However, this is impossible if the program is well-typed, because statement 2 requires that user be tainted and statement 6 requires that str be safe.
We propose a solution using reference immutability [16] , [32] , [35] , [36] , which allows for limited subtyping and improves precision. It is a theorem that subtyping is safe when the reference on the left-hand-side of the assignment (explicit or implicit) is an immutable reference, that is, the state of the referenced object, including its transitively reachable state, cannot be mutated through this reference.
We compose SFlow with ReIm, a reference immutability type system we developed in previous work [16] . We run ReImInfer [16] , ReIm's inference tool, and obtain ReIm types for all variables. If the ReIm type of the left-hand-side of an assignment is readonly, i.e., it is guaranteed that this left-handside is immutable, we use a subtyping constraint in SFlow. Otherwise, i.e., if the ReIm type is not readonly, we use an equality constraint. For example, at (TREAD) x = y.f, if x is readonly in ReIm, we use constraint q y q f <: q x ; otherwise, we use constraint q y q f = q x .
Returning to the above example, user is readonly and therefore statement 4 induces subtyping constraint str <: user. Therefore, str can be safe and user can be tainted, and the program type-checks.
E. Type Inference
Type inference is structured in the framework we developed in [15] . The key idea is to compute a set-based solution S, which maps variables to sets of type qualifiers. This section first describes how to compute the set-based solution, then describes how to extract a concrete typing from the set-based solution. It concludes with a brief discussion.
1) Set-based Solution:
The set-based solution is a mapping S from variables to sets of qualifiers. The variables in the mapping can be (1) local variables, (2) parameters (including this), (3) fields, and (4) method returns. For example, S(x) = {poly, safe} denotes the type of variable x can be poly, or safe, but not tainted. Programmer-annotated variables, including annotated library variables, are initialized to the singleton set that contains the programmer-provided qualifier. In SFlow, all sources and sinks are programmer-provided, i.e., sources and sinks are annotated as tainted and safe respectively. Fields are initialized to S(f) = {tainted, poly}. All other variables are initialized to the maximal set of qualifiers, i.e. S(x) = {tainted, poly, safe}.
The solver creates constraints for all program statements according to the typing rules in Fig. 3 . It takes into account ReIm: if the left-hand-side of the assignment is readonly, the solver creates a subtyping constraint; otherwise, it creates an equality constraint. For example, consider (TREAD) x = y.f. As mentioned earlier, if x is readonly, the solver creates constraint q y q f <: q x ; otherwise, it creates constraint q y q f = q x .
Subsequently, the set-based solver iterates over the constraints. For each constraint c, it removes infeasible qualifiers from the set of variables that participate in c. Consider x = y.f again, and suppose x is readonly, thus allowing for subtyping constraint q y q f <: q x . Suppose that before processing this constraint, we have S(x) = {poly}, S(y) = {tainted, poly, safe}, and S(f) = {tainted, poly}. The solver removes tainted from S(y) because there does not exist q f ∈ S(f) and q x ∈ S(x) that satisfy q y tainted <: q x . After processing the constraint, S is updated to S (x) = {poly}, S (y) = {poly, safe}, and S (f) = {poly}.
The set-based solver iterates over the constraints and refines the sets until it reaches a fixpoint. There are two outcomes.
(1) all variables are assigned nonempty sets in the fixpoint solution. In this case, we say that the set-based solution exists. Or (2) the iteration goes through one or more unsatisfiable constraints, i.e., constraints where a variable gets assigned the empty set. An unsatisfiable constraint causes a type error to be reported. If the set-based solver arrives at a type error, this means that the programmer-provided sources and sinks are inconsistent. A type error indicates that there is unsafe flow from a source to a sink. In this case, we say that a set-based solution does not exist, and neither does a concrete typing exist.
2) Concrete Typing: The set-based solution, when it exists, contains all valid typings of the program (SFlow, similarly to Ownership types [15] and ReIm, permits many concrete typings). The question is, how do we extract a concrete typing?
One potential concrete typing is derived as follows. First, we "preference-rank" the SFlow qualifiers:
tainted > poly > safe Then, for each variable x we pick the maximal element of S(x) according to this ranking. This typing is called the maximal typing. If the maximal typing type-checks, then we have obtained the "most preferred typing" [15] . Unfortunately, the maximal typing does not always typecheck for SFlow. Suppose the set-based solution for statement x = y.m() is: S(x) = {safe}, S(y) = {poly, safe}, and S(ret) = {poly, safe}. The resulting maximal tying is Γ(x) = safe, Γ(y) = poly, and Γ(ret) = poly, but this fails to type-check: y ret is poly poly = poly, which is not a subtype of safe x. We call a conflict a statement/constraint(s), for which the maximal typing fails to type-check.
Fortunately, conflicts occur in only two well-defined cases:
• Method call y.m(z), where S(z) = {safe}, S(y) ⊃ {safe}, S(p) = {poly, safe} and we have equality constraint z = y p (i.e., the parameter is not readonly). We have two choices: (1) p is poly, which forces the receiver y to be safe, and (2) p is safe, which does not impose any constraint on the receiver.
• Method return x = y.m(), where S(x) = {safe}, S(y) ⊃ {safe} and S(ret) = {poly, safe}. Similarly, there are two choices: (1) ret is poly and y is safe, and (2) ret is safe.
We resolve these conflicts automatically, by choosing (1) in both cases. This choice prefers polymorphism in the method signature, which is natural. That is, in the first case, we type p as poly, in the second case, we type ret as poly, and then proceed to recompute the set-based solution. Roughly, the process repeats, until the solver arrives at a set-based solution for which the maximal typing type-checks. Fortunately, conflicts are rare and the inference arrives at a concrete typing quickly.
3) Discussion: We note that in SFlow, the preference ranking is somewhat arbitrary, as we are not interested in a "most preferred typing" in the sense that we are interested in it for Ownership types or ReIm. The preference ranking/maximal typing is simply a technique that extracts a concrete typing.
In SFlow, we are interested in the existence of a concrete typing. This is because the purpose of SFlow is to prove that there is no flow from the programmer-provided sources to the programmer-provided sinks. Any concrete typing, which of course types those sources and sinks as tainted and safe respectively, achieves this purpose.
In our experience with numerous large Java web applications, whenever the set-based solution exists, a concrete typing exists as well, and the methodology described in Section II-E2 easily arrives at a concrete typing. Therefore, for the rest of the paper, we focus our attention on the set-based solver and the type errors revealed by it.
F. Examples
To demonstrate the precision of the type system and inference analysis, we illustrate the handling of two examples, which have posed challenges for previous taint analyses [18] , [30] .
The first example, shown in Fig. 4 is Aliasing5 from Ben Livshits' Stanford SecuriBench Micro benchmarks 2 . Note that foo is safe when b1 and b2 refer to distinct StringBuffer objects. However, when b1 and b2 are aliased, foo creates dangerous flow. Statement 4 in the code (shown in the first column) triggers constraints 4 and 5 (shown in the middle column). Statements 8-12 trigger the correspondingly numbered constraints 8-12. Note that constraint 1 is an equality constraint: b1 is mutated at b1.append(name), ReIm infers b1 as mutable, and hence the equality constraint. Constraint 8 forces name to be tainted, and then constraint 9 forces b1 to be tainted. Constraint 4 forces buf to be tainted and 5 forces b2 to be tainted or poly. Constraint 10 then forces str to be tainted or poly (i.e., the set-based solver removes safe from str's set). The set-based solver reports a type error at statement 12; constraint 12 is an unsatisfiable constraint as it requires that str is safe, which contradicts the finding that str cannot be safe.
The other example, shown in Fig. 5 illustrates the handling of context sensitivity. There are two instances of DataSource, one that holds a tainted string in its f field, and another one that holds a safe string. The code is safe because s2, which flows to the sensitive sink, is read from the "safe" DataSource object. A context-insensitive taint analysis would merge the flows through setUrl and getUrl across the two different instances of DataSource, and report a spurious warning. Fig. 5 illustrates our solution. The inferred typing types class DataSource as polymorphic. The poly types are instantiated to tainted for object ds1 and to safe for object ds2.
As illustrated, the analysis handles naturally these difficult idioms. The handling of DataSource can be interpreted as object sensitivity [20] : essentially, the analysis processes polymorphic setUrl and getUrl separately for object contexts ds1 and ds2, just as standard object-sensitive analysis does. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION TECHNIQUES
SFlow and SFlowInfer are implemented within our type inference framework [15] , [16] , which is built on top of the Checker Framework (CF) [5] , [24] . The type inference framework is publicly available at http://code.google.com/p/type-inference/; SFlow and SFlowInfer will be added shortly.
In this section, we discuss techniques for error reporting (Section III-A), handling of libraries, frameworks and reflection (Section III-B) and precision improvement (Section III-C).
A. Error Reporting
Recall that type errors are revealed by the set-based solver. For example, in Fig. 4 , the set-based solver may report the following error message, which corresponds to an unsatisfiable constraint due to the call to foo at statement 4: This means that buf, declared at line 3, is tainted, but the adapted value of b2, declared at line 6, is safe, because safe = safe. This is more informative than the traditional error reporting with statement number only, as it also provides information about all variables in the constraint. In the set-based solver, type errors occur and are reported at unsatisfiable constraints. Where the unsatisfiable constraint occurs depends on the order of processing of constraints. The unsatisfiable constraint may happen far away from the source or the sink (as it is the case with the above type error), therefore making it difficult for programmers to understand the cause of the type error. In the above type error, the left-hand-side of the constraint buf becomes tainted because of the propagation of the tainted source from req.getParameter("name") to name, then to b1, and finally to buf. We call such type propagation from tainted source forward propagation. Similarly, b2 becomes safe because of the propagation of the safe sink from the parameter of println to str and to b2. We call such type propagation from safe sink backward propagation.
Our taint analysis prefers that type errors be close to the sinks for several reasons. First, it is easier for programmers to understand the cause of a type error. Second, a type error close to the sink directly points to the sink where programmers should add defenses such as sanitizers. Livshits and Chong [17] argue that it is better to place sanitizers close to the sinks.
In order for type errors to happen close to the sinks, the solver prefers forward propagation over backward propagation. It maintains two worklists with constraints: one is the forward list flist and the other one is the backward list blist. Initially, flist contains all constraints and blist is empty. The solver takes out a constraint c from flist and solves it. If c is not satisfiable, the solver reports a type error. If c sets a reference to {safe}, the solver skips updating the set-based solution S and puts c into blist. Finally, if neither of the above two conditions is met, the solver updates the set-based solution S and puts c back into flist. When flist becomes empty, the solver takes out the constraint from blist. This process continues until the solver reaches a fixpoint. The pseudocode is shown in Fig. 6 .
Using this algorithm, the tainted source in Fig. 4 propagates as follows: req.getParameter → name → b1 → buf → b2 → str, because the algorithm processes constraints in order first constraint 8, then 9, then 4, 5, 10 and 12, which is unsatisfiable (this is the order we showed in Section II-F). Thus, the type error happens at statement 12 with the following message: Aliasing5.java:10:str{tainted} <:
(Aliasing5.java:11:writer{tainted, poly, safe}
PrintWriter.java:7:arg0{safe}) Reports a type error with c
13:
else if c sets some variables to {safe} then 14: blist.push(c) until S remains unchanged 20: end procedure where arg0 is the parameter of PrintWriter.println(). This type error is at the sink, therefore programmers can understand the cause better and can also add a sanitizer to protect the information flow.
B. Handling of Libraries, Frameworks and Reflection
Libraries (standard and third-party), frameworks (e.g., Struts, Spring, Hibernate) and reflection are ubiquitous in Java web applications. They are the bane of static taint analysis. We argue that the type-based approach we espouse, handles these features more naturally and arguably more comprehensively than traditional dataflow and points-to based approaches. 1) Libraries: Our inference analysis is modular. Thus, it is able to analyze any given set of classes L. If there is an unknown callee in L, e.g. a library method whose source code is unavailable, the analysis assumes default typing poly, poly → poly for the callee. This typing propagates tainted arguments to the receiver and left-hand-side of the call assignment; similarly, it propagates a safe left-hand-side to the receiver and arguments at the call. For example, String.toUpperCase() is typed as poly String toUpperCase(poly String this)
At call s2 = s1.toUpperCase(); we have constraint s1 poly <: s2 or equivalently s1 <: s2. Thus, a tainted s1 propagates to s2 and similarly, a safe s2 propagates to s1.
We apply the poly, poly → poly typing to all methods in the standard library, third-party libraries (apache-tomcat, xalan, etc.) and frameworks (with some exceptions discussed shortly). This handling will be unsound if library methods communicate through static fields (e.g., a tainted value is passed as an argument to library method m and m stores it into a static field; subsequently, another library method n retrieves and returns the value of the static field to the client). Fortunately, this case does not happen frequently. Furthermore, no static taint analysis for Java web applications handles libraries in a sound way (see [18] , [28] , [31] ); we strongly believe that this is an intractable problem. Our handling is convenient, easy to implement, almost sound and reasonably precise.
2) Frameworks: Most Java web applications are built on top of one or more web application frameworks such as Struts, Spring, and Hibernate. The problem with these frameworks is twofold. First, these frameworks contain "hidden" sources and sinks, i.e., sources and sinks deep in framework code that affect the public API. For example, Hibernate (version 2.1) contains a public method Session.find(String s) where s flows to query at sink prepareStatement(query), which happens deep in the code of Hibernate. We run a version of our inference analysis and "lift" such "hidden" sources and sinks to the parameters and return values of public methods they affect. In the above example, Session.find() is typed as poly List find(poly Session this, safe String s)
Callers to find() in application code must handle the argument of find() as safe. To the best of our knowledge, no other taint analysis attempts to "lift" these "hidden" sources and sinks in the frameworks.
Second, these frameworks rely heavily on reflection and callbacks. As an illustrating example, Struts defines framework classes ActionForm and Action and method Action.execute(ActionForm form). The application built on top of Struts defines numerous xxxForm classes extending ActionForm, and numerous xxxAction classes extending Action. Framework code performs the following (roughly):
1. Action a = Class.forName("input1").newInstance(); this instantiates one user-defined xxxAction classe. 2. ActionForm f = Class.forName("input2").newInstance(); similarly, this instantiates one user-defined xxxForm class. 3. Populate the xxxForm object with tainted values that come from request.getParameter(...) sources. 4. Execute a.execute(f), a callback to user-defined xxxAction.execute().
Reflection and callbacks are notorious issues for traditional dataflow and points-to based analysis, which typically relies on reachability analysis. If reflection is not resolved (and resolving reflection is highly nontrivial), method xxxAction.execute() will never be reached.
The state-of-the-art taint analysis, F4F by Sridharan et al. [28] handles frameworks such as Struts by constructing specifications that summarize reflection and callback-driven framework behavior. In the above example, the F4F specification looks roughly as follows:
1. Action a = new UserAction(); 2. ActionForm f = new UserForm(); 3. Populate the UserForm object with tainted values that come from request.getParameter(...) sources. 4. Execute a.execute(f); The taint analysis knows that UserAction.execute() is reachable and that tainted f flows to its parameter. It then propagates the tainted fields of the UserForm object to sinks. However, F4F is heavily coupled with the XML configurations, and it may not be able to handle newer versions of frameworks, because the XML configurations may change. For example, F4F can only handle versions of Spring up to 2.5.
Such reflection and callbacks are handled effortlessly in our type-based analysis. Action.execute() is typed as execute(poly Action this, tainted ActionForm form)
The method overriding constraints (recall Section II-C) propagate the tainted type to the form parameter of each userdefined execute() method. Our inference processes all xxxAction, xxxForm and xxx jsp files and propagates the tainted fields of the form parameters to all sinks, including sinks in xxx jsp classes. Our solution is simpler and more general because it does not rely on the XML configurations.
3) Reflection: Use of reflection in the application code is widespread as well. Because of this widespread use, ignoring reflection (as many static analyses do) renders a static analysis useless. Consider the example: X x = Class.forName("someInput").newInstance() x.f = a // a is tainted, comes from source y = x b = y.f // b is safe, flows to sink
If a points-to-based static taint analysis fails to handle newInstance(), the points-to sets of x and y will be empty and the flow from a to b will be missed. On the other hand, handling of reflection is notoriously difficult and generally unsound. SFlowInfer handles newInstance() seamlessly and safely. The key is that SFlow does not need to abstract heap objects; instead, it tracks dependences among variables through subtyping. It can be shown that, informally speaking, if x flows to y, then x <: y holds. In the above example, SFlow enforces that x <: y and a <: b. SFlowInfer reports a type error.
C. Precision Improvements
We employ two techniques to improve the precision of SFlow and SFlowInfer. One is the composition with ReIm we described earlier. The other one is special-casing of global mapping data structures Properties from the java.util package, and ServletRequest and HttpSession from the javax.servlet package. In order to illustrate the problem, consider the example in Fig. 7 refactored from benchmark blojsom. At line 6, the tainted inAuthor is put into the mapping of req. Then it is retrieved at line 13 through req.getAttribute() and printed to the client page. The parameter of PrintWriter.print() is a safe sink according to [18] . Therefore, there is unsafe flow from req.getParameter() to out.print().
If outAuthor = req.getAttribute(...) were handled according to the typing rules in Fig. 3 , the safe outAuthor would cause req to be safe, and safe would propagate to all calls to req.setRequest(), not only to the call with argument inAuthor.
Therefore, we special-case set* and get* methods for such mapping data structures, similarly to Sridharan et al. [28] . If the key of the set* method call set(key, value) is a constant, the set-based solver simply creates the equality constraint key = value. Similarly, if the key of get* method call x = get(key) is a constant, the set-based solver creates constraint x = key. For the example in Fig. 7 , the set-based solver enforces BlojsomServlet.BLOJSOM AUTHOR = inAuthor at line 6 and outAuthor = BlojsomServlet.BLOJSOM AUTHOR at line 13. Thus, inAuthor and outAuthor are connected and outAuthor is typed as tainted. The unsafe information flow is detected because there is a type error when passing tainted outAuthor to the safe parameter of out.print().
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section presents our empirical results.
A. Benchmarks
The implementation is evaluated on 13 relatively large Java web applications, used in previous work by Livshits and Lam [18] , Tripp et al. [31] , and Sridharan et al. [28] .
We run SFlowInfer on the above benchmarks on a server with Intel R Xeon R CPU X3460 @2.80GHz and 8 GB RAM (the maximal heap size is set to 2 GB). The software environment consists of Sun JDK 1.6 and the Checker Framework 1.1.5 on GNU/Linux 3.2.0. Fig. 8 presents information about the benchmarks as well as the running time of our analysis in seconds. The running time attests to efficiency -for all but 2 benchmarks, the analysis completes in less than 50 seconds.
B. Experiments 1) Setup:
In our experiments, we use precisely the web sources and sinks described in detail in Livshits and Lam [18] , [19] . In addition, we use 59 sources and sinks in API methods of Struts, Spring and Hibernate, computed as described in Section III-B. There are three categories of web sources [18] : Parameter manipulation, Header manipulation, and Cookie poisoning. There are four categories of sinks [18] : SQL injection, HTTP spliting, Cross-site scripting, and Path traversal. These sources and sinks are added to the annotated JDK, Struts, Spring and Hibernate, which can be easily done with the Checker Framework (CF). Note that once these annotated libraries are created, individual web applications are analyzed with no input from the user/programmer.
We call a pair [source category, sink category] a configuration. Therefore, there are 12 configurations in total. We run the benchmarks with all configurations. We examine all type errors for two configurations: [Parameter manipulation, SQL injection] and [Parameter manipulation, Cross-site scripting]. We examine the type errors for only two of the 12 configurations due to time constraints. If this paper is accepted, we will report on the type errors for all 12 configurations.
2) Classification of Type Errors: We classify the type errors we examined into three categories:
• Type-1 errors reflect direct dependences, i.e., when the source value is a part of the value sent to the sink. The following code, adapted from benchmark webgoat, is a typical Type-1 error:
String u = request.getParameter(''user"); String s = ''SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '' + u; stat.executeQuery(s);
Note that direct dependences can happen through structures and containers (e.g., Fig. 7 , which is adapted from benchmark blojsom, shows a direct dependence from the source at line 5 to the sink at line 16). Often, a tainted string is returned from a call, then passed to a sink. These errors have the highest potential for exploitability.
• Type-2 errors reflect key-value dependences. The following code, adapted from personalblog, is a Type-2 error:
HashMap map = ...; PrintWriter out = ...; String id = request.getParameter(''id''); User user = (User) map.get(id); out.print(user.getName());
The tainted input is used as a key to retrieve the user from the map, then user.getName() is sent to a safe sink (the parameter of PrintWriter.print()). Notice that the hash code property of id is propagated to the sink through the map. This is a dangerous flow according to the semantics of noninterference, as the value of the tainted key affects the value of the safe sink. Our type system enforces this semantics, and therefore, it is justified in reporting this type error. However, in our opinion, these errors are likely of low exploitability.
• Type-3 errors are false positives. We classify as Type-3 every error we could not easily track to a direct dependence or a key-value dependence. . The false positive rate can be improved. As noted earlier, a lot of the false positives have a common source such as the call to PrintWriter.print(), and special-casing such common sources would have likely avoided numerous false positives. At this point, we have decided to limit special-casing, which is generally undesirable, to the cases described in Section III-C.
Both authors have examined the type errors and agreed on the numbers reported in Fig. 9 . We wanted to compare our tool with taint analysis tools from previous work by Livshits and Lam [18] , Tripp et al. [31] , and Sridharan et al. [28] . Unfortunately, these tools are either unavailable or proprietary. We checked the errors reported by Livshits and Lam [18] and confirmed that SFlowInfer covered those errors. We could not compare with [31] and [28] , because their definition of issues is different from ours, and because it is unclear how their set of sources and sinks compares to ours.
In conclusion, our inference analysis is efficient and relatively precise. Therefore, type-based analysis is a promising direction towards effective static analysis of Java web applications.
V. RELATED WORK
There is a large amount of work on information flow control. Due to space constraints we cannot include all related work.
The most closely related to ours is the work by Shankar et al. [26] . They present a type system for detecting string format vulnerabilities in C programs. The type system has two type qualifiers, tainted and untainted; polymorphism is not part of the core system. They include a type inference engine built on top of CQual [8] . CQual, and its counterpart for Java JQual [12] rely on dependence graphs built using points-to analysis. Thus, they still face the burden of reflection and frameworks. In contrast, SFlow and SFlowInfer handle polymorphism naturally, as it is built into the type system using the poly qualifier and viewpoint adaptation. In addition, we compose with reference immutability, thus improving precision significantly. SFlow and SFlowInfer handle reflection and frameworks seamlessly.
Tripp et al. [31] present TAJ, a taint analysis for industrial applications. TAJ is a dataflow and points-to-based analysis. In contrast, our type-based taint analysis is modular and compositional. In order to handle Struts, TAJ treats all Action classes as entry points. In addition, it simulates the passing of all subclasses of ActionForm to Action.execute, by generating a constructor which assigns tainted values to all fields of the subclasses. In contrast, our inference analysis handles Struts by annotating the ActionForm parameter of Action.execute as tainted (See Section III-B2). Our handling is simpler and equally precise. Finally, TAJ approximates the behavior of Java reflection APIs by synthesizing an abstract object whenever the instantiated class can be inferred. It is unclear how TAJ handles reflection when the instantiated class cannot be inferred (e.g. the argument is not a string constant). According to Sridharan et al. [28] , TAJ's reflection modeling is not scalable. In contrast, our type-based analysis does not need abstract objects, and handles reflection seamlessly and safely (See Section III-B3).
Livshits and Lam [18] present a static analysis based on a scalable and precise points-to analysis. In contrast, our inference analysis is type-based and modular. Similarly to TAJ, they handle reflection by trying to infer the value of string s at forName(s).newInstance() calls, while our type-based inference analysis handles reflection as discussed in Section III-B3. In addition, Livshits and Lam's analysis does not handle frameworks, which are essential for web applications.
Sridharan et al. [28] present F4F, a system for taint analysis of framework-based web applications. In order to handle frameworks, F4F analyzes the application code and XML configuration files to construct a specification, which summarizes reflection and callback-driven behavior. However, it is unclear how they adapt to newer framework versions. For example, F4F can only handle versions of Spring up to 2.5. In contrast, our inference analysis handles frameworks by inferring or adding annotations to the sources and the sinks in the frameworks, which is simple and also effective in practice. Tripp et al. [30] present Andromeda, which is a demand-driven analysis that improves on F4F.
Very recent work by Fritz et al. present FlowDroid, a taint analysis for Android [9] . The analysis is dataflow and pointsto based; also, it focuses on Android apps. In contrast, our analysis is type-based and focuses on Java web applications.
Volpano et al. [34] and Myers [21] present type systems for secure information flow. These systems are substantially more complex than SFlow. Also, they focus on type checking and they do not include type inference or include only local (intra-procedural) type inference, while we develop SFlowInfer, which scales to large web applications.
Snelting et al. [10] , [13] , [14] , [27] present information flow analysis based on Program Dependence Graphs (PDGs). Their analysis relies on highly precise context-sensitive dataflow and points-to analysis.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a context-sensitive type system for secure information flow SFlow, and a corresponding inference analysis SFlowInfer. We have proposed a novel approach to the handling of libraries, frameworks, and reflection, which are notoriously hard for dataflow and points-to based taint analysis. We have evaluated our implementation on 13 real-world Java web applications. The inference analysis is precise and scalable.
